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SUE DAVIS
In the early 1970's I began graduate school with an extremely vague
expectation that I would like to study some combination of constitutional law
and political theory. I can remember well my feelings of confusion when I
was told that "public law" was a declining and marginal area of political science. Moreover, much of public law appeared to consist of counting judges'
votes, assigning "scores" and of Bloc Analysis and Guttman Scales rather
than "traditional" doctrinal analysis. I recollect hearing (or perhaps reading)
that when political scientists engaged in "traditional" analysis they were unnecessarily duplicating the scholarship produced by law professors. 1 C. Herman Pritchett's teaching and Walter F. Murphy's articles on constitutinal
interpretation in the late 1970's 2 provided much needed reassurance and
encouragement. Still, a number of years later the advice of several anonymous manuscript reviewers to the effect that my articles "would be more
appropriate for a law journal" served to increase my doubts about the role
of constitutional scholarship in the discipline of Political Science.
Fortunately, the times are changing. Both the quantity and quality of
scholarship by political scientists during the last few years suggests that
constitutional theory is in the process of resuming a prominent position
within the discipline. For example, Walter F. Murphy, WilliamF. Harris III,
and James E. Fleming have recently published an extraordinary casebook. 3
A number of important works on the role of the Supreme Court and constitutional interpretation have been written by political scientists including Sotirios Barber, 4 Lief Carter, 5 and John Agresto .6 Two of the three works
discussed in this essay were authored by political scientists. Moreover,
some of the political science journals have become more amenable to publishing articles on constitutional theory.
The bicentennial of the Constitution (which constitutional scholars have
been celebrating for at least two years) has enhanced political scientists' interest in constitutional theory. Additionally, the recent speeches by Attor85

ney General Edwin Meese have not only encouraged the academic debate
regarding constitutional interpretation and the role of the Supreme Court
but, by demonstrating that the debate is not "merely" academic, have captured the attention of millions of Americans.
The discourse regarding the Constitution revolves around three questions: What is the nature of the Constitution? How should it be interpreted?
And who should do the interpreting - does the Supreme Court have the final say in resolving constitutional questions? 7 The books discussed here are
concerned with all three of the questions; the central issue upon which they
converge, however , is that of constitutional interpretation.
Interpretive methods have been organized and labeled and then reorganized and re-labeled. The literature on the subject is voluminous.8 Briefly
(and over-simplistically), one mode of interpretation searches for the meaning of the Constitution by ascertaining the intentions of those who adopted
it. This mode has been labeled variously as "interpretivism," "intentionalism," "originalism," "textualism," "preservativism, " and "positivism''. An
opposing mode of interpretation searches for constitutional meaning by identifying values that are essential to modern society and therefore perceived
to be in the "spirit" of the Constitution. This mode is known variously as
"noninterpretivism," "supplementalism", "nonoriginalism", "rejectionism,"
and "structuralism". Whereas the first mode purports to remain faithful to
the words of the text, the second reaches beyond the four corners of the
document for constitutional meaning. Also, the first mode presupposes that
the the meaning of the Constitution, determined by its adopters, is fixed and
unchanging. The second is more consistent with the notion that the Constitution's meaning evolves in order to keep pace with the values and demands
of modern society.
To speak of only two modes of interpretation is grossly misleading because there are many more than two ways to interpret. 9 For example, it is
possible to use the intent of the framers as a basis for discerning the meaning of the Constitutional meaning without attempting to discover their specific intent in particular clauses. One might, instead, attempt to discover a
more general intent of the framers in light of the dominant political ideas of
their time. Thus, the interpreter might appeal to the spirit rather than the
letter of the Constitution but with reference to the intent of the framers
rather than to contemporary values. A distinction must therefore be made
between "general intentionalism" and "specific intentionalism" 10
For the purposes of the present discussion the crucial issue in interpretation is, to what extent should one rely on the framers as a source of authority for understanding the meaning of the Constitution? The authors of
the three the books discussed in this essay are committed to what I have
called "general intentionalism".
According to Gary J. Jacobsohn, who is a political science professor at
Williams College, an understanding of the political-legal theories that informed the framing and early development of the Constitution provides the
key to its proper interpretation. The theme of The Supreme Court and the
Decline of Constitutional Aspiration is that the natural rights tradition, which
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occupied a central position in the early constitutional experience, has been
abandoned by modem constitutional theory.
In regard to the question of how the Constitution should be interpreted
Jacobsohn has staked out a middle ground between the "specific intentionalists" and those who search outside the document for principles of justice.
Jacobsohn finds his middle ground in the notion that principles of natural justice are not external to the Constitution; they are instead, contained within
it.
As his title suggests, Jacobsohn views the abandonment of natural
rights doctrine as a major problem in modem constitutional interpretation a "decline" in constitutional theory. He calls for a return to constitutional aspiration, which will consist of "an effort by judges to retrieve, where relevant, the constitutional aspirations of the framers" 11 as a guide to
interpreting, understanding and applying our fundamental law.
In separate chapters (some of which have been previously published in
political science journals) Jacobsohn examines the theories of Roscoe Pound,
Ronald Dworkin, Raoul Berger, Thomas Grey, and John Hart Ely. He contrasts their theories with those of the men who played leading roles in shaping the Constitution, including James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, John
Marshall, and Abraham Lincoln in order to demonstrate the modem rejection of the natural rights tradition.
Jacobsohn effectively contrasts the old and the new constitutional theory in an early chapter by placing Roscoe Pound's notion of law (a science
created by society for the purpose of realizing social interests and protecting
social relations) alongside the eighteenth century conception of the law
(based on self-evident truths). Pound, Jacobsohn explains, embraced a utilitarian "good" as what most people wanted at any given time, whereas
James Madison envisioned a community with permanent interests separate
from the totality of group interests. Pound's legal theory also revised the
role of judge from the framers idea that judges would be guardians who
would protect permanent legal-political principles to social engineers who
would recognize that rights vary with changing mores and values.
Jacobsohn further demonstrates the departure of modem theory from
the natural rights orientation of the eighteenth century in a critique of Ronald Dworkin's jurisprudence. Dworkin's divergence from earlier constitutional theory, Jacobsohn notes, can be found in part in his view of the
Constitution as countermajoritarian and the consequent need for an activist,
rights-oriented Supreme Court. For Madison, in contrast, the Constitution
was a majoritarian document that built protection of minorities into the political process. Jacobsohn argues further that Dworkin's theory has also diverged from that of the framers in its substitution of moral philosophy for
the intent of the framers. Dworkin has made the Constitution an "object of
transvaluation" 12 by focusing on the fundamental right to equality and has,
moreover, effected a transvaluation of the function of the judiciary by requiring the Court to quarantee that equality.
Although Jacobsohn does not attempt to refute Raoul Berger's "specific
intentionalist" approach to constitutional interpretation, he does seek to
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demonstrate that the Constitution is not the positivistic document that Berger presents. Berger's portrayal of the Constitution, Jacobsohn asserts, is
based on a misconstrual of the ideas of Alexander Hamilton, who "would
have been comfortable with the implication that the Constitution incorporates immutable principles of natural justice within the confines of its positive law." 13
Raoul Berger argues that the natural rights tradition is irrelevant to
constitutional interpretation. By contrast, Thomas Grey has claimed that the
natural rights tradition of the eighteenth century created a set of legally biding principles that judges could utilize as an unwritten constitution, supplementary to the written one. It is in this context that Jacobsohn most
effectively illustrates his middle ground. In his view, the written Constitution was meant to embody commitment of the framers to the natural rights:
Therefore, judicial appeals to "higher law" are not
justifiable when they lead to a distinction between written
and unwritten constitutions, but they are justifiable insofar
as they help explicate and illuminate the written words of
the Constitution itself. 14
Jacobsohn's argument, to be successful, requires at least the following.
First, he must persuade the reader that the natural rights tradition, was indeed
central to the ideas of the men who shaped the Constitution. Second, he needs
to demonstrate the modem rejection of that tradition. Finally, he needs to
demonstrate the need to return to the natural rights tradition of the framers.
Jacobsohn's method of drawing sharp contrasts between old and new constitutional thought is an effective means of fulfillingthe first two requirements.
His failure to fulfill the third requirement is the major shortcoming of the book.
Jacobsohn neglects to provide a justification for relying on the political theory
of the eighteenth century for our understanding of the Constitution. Indeed,
he treats the authority of the framers as a settled issue in constitutional interpretation.
If the Supreme Court were to adopt Jacobsohn's view of the Constitution,
how would it resolve the current disputes over such issues as the exclusionary
rule, capital punishment, abortion, and the application of the Bill of Rights to
the states? To be sure, judges who appeal to principles of natural law would
not be considered to be abusing their discretion because they would remain
faithful to the framers intent. Jacobsohn, however, declines to enter the realm
of particular issues. He goes only so far as to assert that the application of his
natural rights Constitution would involve an orientation "that expresses a broad
commitment to the type of polity the Constitution aspires to have." 15
Jacobsohn contends that his Constitution, properly understood, provides
the intellectual context for finding what is permanent in our fundamental law.
But questions of the way that Constitution would apply to particular cases
remain unanswered. In short, even if we accept Jacobsohn's assertion that the
legal theories of the eighteenth century should serve as a guide to interpreting
the Constitution today, we are left with little insight into what that actually
means.
88

Christopher Wolfe's The Rise of Modem Judicial Review is a lengthy
history of the Supreme Court's view of its function as interpreter of the Constitution. His thesis is that the judicial function and the nature of constitutional
interpretation have undergone a profound transformation. The judiciary now
exercises judicial "will" rather than "merely judgment" 16 and has usurped
legislative power. Like Jacobsohn, Wolfe perceives the change from old theories and practices to new as an unwelcome and unfortunate deterioration of
the original understanding of the nature of the Constitution, how it should be
interpreted, and who should do the interpreting.
Wolfe, who teaches political science at Marquette University, divides the
history of judicial review into three eras. He portrays the first, the era of
traditional or moderate judicial review from 1789 unW 1890, as a time when
there was major agreement on the principles of constitutional interpretation.
During the traditional era, according to Wolfe, justices usually followed the
rules of interpretation provided by Sir William Blackstone in his Commentataries on the Laws of England published in 1770 utilizing the five basic signs:
"the words, the context, the subject-matter, the effects and consequences,
or the spirit and reason of the law." 17 According to Wolfe, such rules were
so widely accepted by American lawyers at the time of the framing that the
issue of interpretation was not discussed . Wolfe asserts that Chief Justice John
Marshall followed those rules in his decisions that were so crucial to the
development of judicial and congressional power.
While the traditional era was dominated by John Marshall's correct understanding of the Constitution, during the second era, which lasted until 1937,
judges began to depart from early principles of interpretation and to expand
the role of the judiciary. The transitional era was dominated by judicial activism
to overturn legislative attempts to regulate business. Still, the justices continued to relate their decisions to particular provisions in the Constitution. Moreover, during the transitional era judges' "self-understanding" allowed them to
maintain a belief that they were adhering to the original principles of judicial
review.
In the third, or modern era the judiciary has expanded constitutional
provisions beyond all recognition. Locating the roots of the transformation in
legal realism, Wolfe argues that the realists were mistaken in their attempt to
dispel the myth of mechanical jurisprudence. Judges, at least during the traditional era, did not base their decisions on extra-legal factors but rather on
widely accepted principles of interpretation. Indeed, Chief Justice John Marshall
was faithful to the original intent of the Constitution. Thus, Wolfe places the
responsibility for the transformation of judicial review on the legal realists who
suggested that judges did not merely discover the law but created it out of
their own experience.
Wolfe urges a return to a traditional judicial review that would result in a
Constitution "fairly interpreted to faithfully express the meaning it was given
by its authors and understood by those who gave it authority by ratifying it." 18
He urges us to reexamine our foundations, to renew our acquaintance with
the political philosophy of the men who established the Constitution, so that
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we may appreciate and understand it and apply their approach to constitutional
interpretation.
The Rise of Modem Judicial Review fills 356 pages. One of the reasons
the book is disappointing is that a major portion of it consists of familiar case
analysis of little value to any reader who has read even one general book on
the history of the Supreme Court. It is not clear for whom the book is intended.
While academic readers will be annoyed when they encounter an outline of the
Bill of Rights, only the most patient undergraduates will be willing to wade
through all the material that the book includes.
There are, however , more serious substantive problems with the book.
Cut to the essentials, Wolfe's thesis consists of the following assertions:
l. The proper method of interpretating the Constitution consists of applying rules of interpretation that keep it faithful to the intent of the framers.
2. That method was dominate until 1890.
3. Chief Justice Marshall did not take a position in favor of judicial supremacy but rather in favor of constitutional supremacy .
4. The traditional approach should serve as a model for modem constitutional review.

The reader needs to be persuaded that the first assertion is true before
the argument can proceed. Wolfe, unfortunately, does very little to explain
exactly why it is that the principles of interpretation he urges are the proper
ones. We are essentially told only that they are proper because the were the
original principles. His attempt to demonstrate that those principles were,
indeed, the original ones over and that there was very little disagreement over
them is, moreover , unconvincing. Thus Wolfe fails to secure the foundation
for his indictment of modem judicial review.
It may be that modem readers (including this reviewer) have so thoroughly
absorbed legal realism that we cannot believe that John Marshall did not engage
in some creating of law. Perhaps our experience with the post-1937 Court has
imbued us with a devotion to the idea that the judiciary should protect personal
rights. We may, in short, have so thoroughly departed from our original judicial
tradition that we can no longer even believe in it. It is possible that traditional
judicial review was proper and its modem version is an aberration. Nevertheless, for this reviewer Wolfe's contention that judicial review in the nineteenth
century was fundamentally different and superior to what the Supreme Court
has been doing since 1937 borders on the incredible.
Wolfe's portrayal of John Marshall as a judge who, unlike modem jurists,
was faithful to the established principles of constitutional interpretation and
indeed to the original meaning of the Constitution is appealing but ultimately
unconvincing. Wolfe's analysis of modem judicial review, however, is not even
appealing. It is, in fact, predictable and stale. For example, Wolfe says of the
Court's's decision in Craig v Boren (striking down on equal protection grounds
an Oklahoma law that allowed 21 year old males and 18 year old females to
purchase beer): "The Court ... was striking down the law under the influence
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of elite intellectual hostility to the notion of important sex differences that are
legally cognizable." 19 Moreover, his comparison of Roe v Wade to Dred Scott
can only be described as offensive:
In each case major support for the Court came from
"pro-choice" sentiment ("popular sovereignty" in regard
to slavery and the territories, a women's "right to privacy")
in regard to abortion. 20
Such inappropriate comparisons add nothing to the serious debate regarding the constitutional right to privacy.
Michael Kent Curtis' No State Shall Abridge provides a much more specific
treatment of constitutional interpretation than either of the other two works
reviewed here. Rather than advocate an approach to interpreting the Constitution, Curtis simply applies his method and does the interpreting himself.
Curtis, an attorney for a Greensboro, North Carolina law firm, presents the
thesis that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to make the
Bill of Rights applicable to the states .
Curtis's method of discerning the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment
is to examine the intent of the framers "in light of the anti-slavery crusade
that produced" the Amendment. Although the intent of the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment has been thoroughly examined numerous times, 2 1 Curtis offers some fresh insight by including in the framework of his analysis
principles of Republican constitutional theory. These include the Republican
convictions that the Thirteenth Amendment made blacks citizens; that the Bill
of Rights applied to the states before the Fourteenth Amendment; that the
Privileges and Immunities of Article IV of the Constitution protected fundamental rights against state action; and that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment protected people from enslavement in Washington, D.C.
In order to take Republican theory into account, Curtis extends his examination of the historical materials beyond the debates on the Fourteenth
Amendment to the congressional debates on the Thirteenth Amendment, on
Reconstruction, and the Civil Rights Bill. He also avoids one of the pitfalls of
"intentionalism" by defining, at the outset, "the framers" as the proponents
of the Fourteenth Amendment, primarily the Republicans who were members
of the committee that reported the Amendment to Congress such as Representative John Bingham, the author of the Amendment, and Senator Jacob
Howard who managed the Amendment in the Senate .
No State Shall Abridge considers many questions about the Fourteenth
Amendment that have been addressed previously, including the relationship
between the Civil Rights Bill and the Amendment, Bingham's understanding
of the law at the time including his understanding of the privileges or immunities
clause of Article IV, what Bingham meant when he referred to the Bill of
Rights, and the significance of the change in language from Bingham's initial
proposal. 22
Charles Fairman and Raoul Berger, who both argued that the framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to make the Bill of Rights applicable
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to the states, are Curtis' prime targets. For example, Curtis rejects Fainnan's
assessment of Bingham. According to Curtis, Bingham was not confused about
the law and and did not mistakenly believe that the Bill of Rights already applied
to the states; he was, in Curtis' judgment, well aware of Barron v Baltimore
but strongly disagreed with it. Additionally, Curtis refutes the argument that
because the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment said very little about the
applicability of the Bill of Rights to the states they did not intend it to apply.
He offers the alternative explanation that they did not discuss the issue at
length because they assumed the Bill of Rights would apply, which certainly
makes sense if they believed that it should apply.
Curtis' argument is appealing and clearly more convincing than that of
either Fairman or Berger. Curtis' research is careful and thorough. He is
innocent of the misleading omissions in his selective quotations such as those
that can be found in Berger's Government by Judiciary.23 Curtis makes sense
out of the statements of the proponents of the Amendments, in contrast to
both Berger and Fairman who contended that leading Republicans were confused and muddled about the Jaw and that their statements , therefore, should
not be taken seriously. With his careful analysis Curtis provides a valuable
rejoinder to those who argue that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
did not intend to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states.
The shortcoming of No State Shall Abridge is that it fails to provide a
compelling justification for its method. Curtis makes no effort to overcome the
numerous objections to "intentionalism". One problem with that mode of interpretation in general and with Curtis' analysis in particular is that an examination
of the statements made by framers leads - apparantly unavoidably - to
second-guessing and psychologizing. For example, what did Senator Howard
really mean when he asserted that the privileges (of Article IV) should include
"the personal rights guaranteed and secured by the
first eight amendments to the Constitution; such as" free dom of speech and press , the right to assemble, the right
to bear arms, not to have troops quartered in private
homes during peacetime, to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures and from unreasonable bail, to be
tried by an impartialjury, to be informed of the nature of
an accusation, and to be free from cruel and unusual punishments . 24
Did "such as" mean "illustrative of the all of the Bill of Rights"? Or did it
mean "here is a list of all the rights that are applicable"? What did he really
mean? Who can ever say for certain? Walter F. Murphy wrote in 1978 that
"the difficulties that confront any painstakingly thorough and intellectually scrupulous researcher who tries to establish legislative intent are typically insuperable." 25
In that same article Murphy suggested that the framers probably did not
intend "their specific interpretations of the sweeping language they used to
bind future generations. They would have recognized that the future would
bring problems that the framers had never encountered or foreseen." 26 H.
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Jefferson Powell has elaborated on the same objection in a recent article in
which he argues persuasively that the framers did not believe that examination
of the intent of specific individuals was an appropriate method of interpreting
the Constitution. 27 Curtis would have done well to address such problems.
Jacobsohn, Wolfe, and Curtis all simply assume that "intentionalism" is
the proper mode of interpreting the Constitution; thus, none of them seem to
perceive a need to provide a compelling justification for it. The arguments for
"intentionalism" most often include the following. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land; "intentionalism" will not only enable us to keep our
commitment to that supreme law but it will also assure consistency in its
meaning. "Intentionalism" is consistent with the institutional arrangements
provided in the Constitution insofar as it limits the activity of the judiciary, and
thereby allows more room for the political process to function in a democratic
manner. Judicial power is not legitimate unless judges adhere to the intent of
the framers and thereby eliminate the possibility of imposing their own values
on constitutional decisions. The framers were correct in their vision of republican government; thus, modem interpretation must not deviate from that
vision. The framers intended that future interpreters would rely on their intent.
All three of the authors discussed here treat the argument for "intentionalism" as settled when, in actuality, it is at the center of an intense debate.
Lief Carter has affirmed the intensity of the debate by asserting that, "The
case for constitutional interpretation bound strictly to text and history is only
slightly stronger than the case for the proposition that we inhabit a flat earth." 28
Each of the three works discussed here provides a significant contribution
to the discourse concerning the nature of the Constitution, how it should be
interpreted, and who should interpret it. Still, it is important to note that
Jacobsohn, Wolfe, and Curtis represent only one side of multifaceted discourse.
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NOTES
'It is quite possible that a law professor was the source of this statement.
For example, "The Art of Constitutional Interpretation: A Preliminary Showing," in M. Judd
Harmon (ed.), Essays on the Constitution of the United States (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat
Press , 1978).
3
American Constitutional Interpretation (Mineola, NY: The Foundation Press , 1986). Ralph
Rossum and G. Alan Tarr 's American Constitution Law has recently come out in its Second Edition
(New York: St. Martin's Press , 1987).
' On What the Constitution Means (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1984).
5
Contemporary Constitutional Lawmaking: The Supreme Court and the Art of Politics (New
York: Pergamon Press , 1985).
6
The Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1984).
7
See, Murphy, Harris , and Fleming, American Constitutional Interpretation.
8
Rather than fill several pages with references to works on constitutional interpretation, I
have decided to refer to just one that I have found particularly helpful: William F . Harris Il,
"Bonding of Word and Polity: The Logic of American Constitutionalism," American PoliticalScience
Review 76:34-45(1982).
•see, Paul Brest , "The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding," Boston University Law Review 60:204-238 (1980).
10
Brest identifies "moderate originalism," as a method whereby,
The text of the Constitution is authoritative, but many of its provisions are treated as
inherently open-textured. The original understanding is also important, but judges are more
concerned with adopters' general purposes than with their intentions in a very precise sense.
(Ibid. , 205)
"Jacobsohn, p. 140.
12Ibid., p. 38.
3
' Ibid., p. 71.
"Ibid., p. 75.
15Ibid., p. 141.
16
"[the judiciary] may truly be said to have neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment."
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist 78 as quoted in Wolfe, p. 357, n. 5.
17
As quoted in Wolfe, p. 18.
18 Ibid., p. 354.
19Ibid., p. 306.
20Ibid., p. 308.
21See, for example, Horace E. Flack, The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment (Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1908); Jacobus tenBroek, Equal Under Law ("Collier Books"; London:
Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1965). Howard Jay Graham, Everyman's constitution: Historical Essays
on the Fourteenth Amendment, The "Conspiracy Theory" and American Constitutionalism (Madison, Wisconsin: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1968); Joseph B. James, The Framing of
the Fourteenth Amendment (Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1956). Justice Black's dissenting
opinion in Adamson v California (322 U.S. 46, 92-123 (1946]). Charles Fairman, "Does the
Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate th.e Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding," Stanford
Law Review 2:5-139 (1949). Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: Harvard University Press,
1977).
22Bingharn's initial proposal provided that
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to
secure to the citizens of each state all privileges and irnmuities of citizens in the several
states (Article IV, section 2); and to all persons in the several states equal protection in the
rights of life, liberty, and property (5th Amendment) (as quoted in Curtis, p. 57).
23
Curtis points out, for example, that Berger credited Bingham with the following statement:
The care of the property, the liberty, and the life of the citizen... is in the States, and
not in the Federal Government. I have sought to effect no change in that respect. . .I have
advocated here an amendment which would arm Congress with the power to punish all
violations of the bill of rights. . . I have always believed that protection ... within the States
of all the rights of person and citizen, was of the power reserved to the states. (Government
by Judiciary, pp. 143-44, as quoted in Curtis, p. 123)
What Bingham actually said was:
The care of the property, the liberty, and the life of the citizen under the solemn sanction
of an oath imposed by your Federal Constitution, is in the States, and not in the Federal
Government. I have sought to effect no change in that respect in the Constitution of the
country. I have advocated here an amendment which would arm Congress with the power
to compel obedience to the oath, and punish all violations by State officers of the Bill of
Rights, but leaving those officers to discharge the duties enjoined upon them as citizens of
the United States by that oath and by that Constitution. (Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
1292 (1866] (emphasis added by Curtis) as quoted in Curtis, p. 123)
2
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As quoted, Curtis, p. 111 (emphasis added by Curtis).
"Constitutional Interpretation: The Art of the Historian, Magician, or Statesman?" Review
of Government by Judiciary, The YaleLaw Journal87:1752-1771 (1978).
26lbid., 1769.
27"The Original Understanding of Original Intent," HarvardLaw Review 98:885-948 (1985).
28 Carter, p. 41.
24
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